Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy

Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy

eBook - 1997
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MIT Press

The relationship between political and economic cycles is one of the most widely studied topics in political economics. This book examines how electoral laws, the timing of elections, the ideological orientation of governments, and the nature of competition between political parties influence unemployment, economic growth, inflation, and monetary and fiscal policy. The book presents both a thorough overview of the theoretical literature and a vast amount of empirical evidence.A common belief is that voters reward incumbents who artificially create favorable conditions before an election, even though the economy may take a turn for the worse immediately thereafter. The authors argue that the dynamics of political cycles are far more complex. In their review of the main theoretical approaches to the issues, they demonstrate the multifaceted relationships between macroeconomic and political policies. They also present a broad range of empirical data, from the United States as well as OECD countries. One of their most striking findings is that the United States is not exceptional; the relationships between political and economic cycles are remarkably similar in other democracies, particularly those with two-party systems.



Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c1997
ISBN: 9780585135694
058513569X
0262011611
Characteristics: 1 online resource (xii, 302 p.)
Additional Contributors: Cohen, Gerald D. 1966-
Roubini, Nouriel

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